Introduction
Similarities in European Union (EU) citizens' norms and values have been essential in facilitating political and economic integration into EU institutions. Yet despite some similarities in citizens' beliefs, there remains debate about the extent to which a common "European" political culture exists. In particular, several scholars have pointed to an East-West divide, arguing that Eastern Europeans hold different attitudes toward the government's role in providing social protection (Corneo & Gruner 2002; Mason 1995; Arts et al. 1995) . Their work suggests that Eastern Europeans demand more from the welfare state than Western Europeans because of their socialization into socialist norms under communism. More recently, however, some scholars have argued that Europeanization processes have changed Eastern European political culture by socializing the East into Western liberal norms (Schimmelfennig 2000 (Schimmelfennig , 2005 Checkel 2005) . If Eastern Europeans have indeed adopted many of Western Europe's norms and values, then there may no longer be signifi cant differences in Eastern and Western Europeans' attitudes toward the welfare state.
Comparing Eastern and Western Europeans' attitudes toward the welfare state consequently offers some important insights to whether Europeanization may have socialized Eastern Europeans into Western norms. Alderson (2001, 417) defi nes state socialization as "the process by which states internalize norms originating elsewhere in the international system," and identifi es individual belief change as a key aspect of state socialization. If Eastern Europe has been socialized into Western norms during the EU accession process, then we might expect that Eastern Europeans' attitudes toward redistributive policies would have changed to resemble Western Europeans' attitudes. Comparing Eastern and Western Europeans' attitudes may therefore shed light on whether changes in Eastern European political culture have coincided with increasing integration into European institutions. Examining changes in Eastern Europeans' attitudes toward the welfare state may also offer broader insights to whether regional organizations transmit norms that shape domestic political culture.
Using data from the International Social Survey Project's (ISSP) 1999 and 2009 Social Inequality surveys, I examine whether Eastern and Western Europeans' attitudes toward income redistribution have converged since the East's accession to the EU. Attitudes toward income redistribution refl ect more general attitudes toward the welfare state because they tap into the redistributive norms underlying specifi c welfare state programs. They may therefore serve as an appropriate approximation of people's support for the state providing social protection to vulnerable groups.
I begin with a survey of past research on various factors that affect attitudes toward income redistribution and broader social welfare policies. In reviewing the literature, I generate hypotheses on what may shape attitudes toward redistribution in Eastern and Western Europe. Then, I describe my methodology for testing these hypotheses and subsequently present the results. My preliminary fi ndings show that despite remarkable stability in average levels of support for redistribution in Eastern Europe, there have been some important shifts in the ways that Eastern Europeans form attitudes toward redistribution. Between 1999 and 2009, Eastern Europeans began to form attitudes toward income redistribution more similarly to Western Europeans. I conclude by discussing the changes in Europeans' opinion formation processes and by offering suggestions for further research to elucidate the mechanisms behind the convergence that I observe.
Micro-Level Factors Shaping Attitudes toward Redistribution
Previous research on welfare state attitudes has identifi ed socio-demographic characteristics as key factors shaping people's self-interested support for redistributive policies. People are typically less supportive of income redistribution if they come from socioeconomic groups that are unlikely to benefi t from more government social protection (Hasenfeld & Rafferty 1989; Svalfors 1997; Luo 1998) . For example, employed people and those with high incomes often express negative views toward redistributive policies because they are unlikely to benefi t from them directly (Guillaud 2013; Jaeger 2006; Moene & Wallerstein 2001) . The better educated also generally express less support for redistribution, in part because education is often an indicator of higher class status and earning potential (Jaeger 2006; Linos & West 2003; Andreß & Heien 2001) .
Gender and family roles may also affect people's self-interested support for social welfare assistance. Married people, and particularly couples with young children, may be more supportive of expansive welfare state policies that offer child care and education benefi ts (Jaeger 2006) . Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) also fi nd that women are typically more supportive of expansive welfare state arrangements and posit that their higher support may stem from historical differences in gendered work roles. Because women have traditionally performed most of the unpaid work caring for the sick or elderly, women are likely to be the primary benefi ciaries of a more expansive welfare state that may pay them to perform caregiving tasks. Women also live longer than men and are therefore more likely than men to need long term care from the state in their old age (Romoren & Blekesaune 2003 ).
Although people with more self-interest in redistributive policies often show more support for them, some researchers doubt that self-interest is a signifi cant causal determinant of people's attitudes toward social welfare policies (Fong 2001; Papadakis & Bean 1993; Papadakis 1993) . For example, Fong (2001) shows that even the rich have considerable support for certain redistributive benefi ts and concludes that that fi nancial self-interest is an insuffi cient explanation for variations in redistribution attitudes. Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom (2003) also fi nd that self-interest's effect on attitudes varies depending on contextual factors. They show that employment status is a signifi cant predictor of attitudes toward government welfare spending in Western Europe, but it is not signifi cantly related to Eastern Europeans' preferences. They conclude that differences in Eastern and Western Europeans' support may stem from the East's experience with economic hardship during the post-communist transition, which left even employed people vulnerable to market forces. Recent experiences with economic hardship and vulnerability may consequently increase feelings of risk among the population at large and diminish socioeconomic status's effect on redistributive attitudes. Although previous research sometimes identifi es age as a socio-demographic group factor that could shape self-interested support for social welfare policies (Lipsmeyer 2003; Hasenfeld & Rafferty 1989; Blekesaune 2007) , age effects may be complex and may interact with other factors in shaping people's attitudes. On the one hand, older people may benefi t more from pensions and other forms of social protections targeted to the elderly. On the other hand, older people may also have more wealth accumulated than younger people. This may explain why some of the previous research identifi es an inconsistent relationship between age and support for various redistributive policies (Jaeger 2006; Lipsmeyer & Nordstrom 2003; Gingrich & Ansell 2012) . Support for redistribution among older people may therefore be more closely linked to other indicators of class status than age.
However, age may nevertheless be a signifi cant predictor of people's support for redistributive policies in Eastern Europe. Age may tap into the ways that prior socialization experiences under communism affect social justice norms. Arts et al. (1995) argue that under communism, Eastern Europeans developed perceptions of justice that were rooted in Marxist ideological perceptions. Older Eastern Europeans' social justice norms may therefore signifi cantly differ from those of younger Eastern Europeans and Western Europeans, who were socialized into more liberal economic norms. In addition to socio-demographic factors, ideology and belief systems may also affect welfare preferences (Fong 2001; Luo 1998; Groskind 1994 1993 ; Jaeger 2006; Linos & West 2003; Lipsmeyer & Nordstrom 2003) . Previous research identifi es people's beliefs about social mobility as a key predictor of support for income redistribution (Linos & West 2003; Guillaud 2013; Groskind 1994; Luo 1998) . For example, Luo (1998) 
Macro-Level Factors Shaping Attitudes toward Redistribution
Previous research on attitudes toward the welfare state suggests that country-level contextual factors may also shape support for income redistribution. Because people live in social environments, they likely draw on aspects of their environments when forming attitudes and preferences. It is therefore important to take into account the ways that country-level contextual factors shape individual beliefs.
Historical experience with communism may be a particularly important factor in explaining variations in Europeans' attitudes. Scholars have identifi ed a distinct postsocialist regime effect on welfare state attitudes (Dallinger 2010; Andreß & Heien 2001; Svalfors 1997; Arts et al. 1995) . However, their studies have largely relied on data prior to the East's EU accession. The EU accession process leveraged profound structural changes in Eastern Europe (Vachudova 2005; Pridham 1999; Kopstein & Reilly 2000; Schimmelfennig & Scholtz 2008 Macroeconomic indicators may also be strong predictors of people's opinions about redistributive policies. In particular, higher national unemployment rates are often associated with higher levels of support for redistribution (Blekesaune 2007; Blekesaune & Quadagno 2003) . Blekesaune and Quadagno (2003) people's awareness of the risks of becoming unemployed and vulnerable to market conditions. Higher unemployment rates may also increase people's concerns for a larger share of unemployed people who may need state social protection.
Hypothesis 5: Higher unemployment rates are likely associated with higher support for income redistribution.
Substantial changes in the macroeconomic environment may also shape attitudes toward welfare state policies. Although there has been a dearth of research on the ways that economic crises shape attitudes toward the welfare state, previous research has shown that people are typically less altruistic and less willing to forfeit their income to support the welfare state during periods of economic decline (Rose & Peters 1978; Alt 1979; Sihvo & Uusitalo 1995) . Scholars have also pointed to country-level inequality as a predictor of individuals' attitudes toward redistribution. In particular, Moene and Wallerstein (2001) argue that income inequality increases popular support for redistributive benefi ts because it increases the distance between the mean and median income. If more people fall below the mean income, then there may be more support for social protection benefi ts. By contrast, Dallinger (2010) observes that there is often an inconsistent relationship between the actual level of inequality in a country and citizens' demands for income redistribution. People's social justice values may cause them to hold different attitudes regarding identical levels of inequality, and therefore the level of inequality may be a weak predictor of variations in attitudes across countries (Lubker 2004; 2007; Dallinger 2010 ).
Hypothesis 7: The level of income inequality is likely a weak predictor of attitudes toward income redistribution.
Finally, scholars have drawn on Esping-Andersen's (1990) categorization of capitalist welfare regimes into liberal, conservative, and social democratic to explore whether welfare regime type affects citizens' attitudes toward the welfare state 2 . Svalfors (1997) , for example, fi nds that each of Esping-Andersen's welfare regime types and an additional "post-socialist" regime has a distinct effect on popular support for welfare-state intervention. However, Dallinger (2010) fi nds that countries of different 2 Esping-Andersen describes liberal regimes as those where assistance is means-tested, universal transfers are modest, or social insurance schemes dominate. Conservative regimes are those with a historic corporatiststatist legacy, where liberal commitments to market effi ciency and commodifi cation of labor were not critical aspects of social policy. In these regimes, the Church historically played a key role in preserving traditional family structures and emphasizing the family's role in providing welfare assistance. Finally, social democratic regimes are those that emphasize egalitarianism and de-commodifi cation of labor. These regimes promote a level of economic equality that goes beyond ensuring that minimal needs are universally satisfi ed. regime types appear to have similar levels of support for income redistribution. This suggests that there may be an inconsistent relationship between a country's welfare regime type and its citizens' support for income redistribution.
The relationship between welfare regime type and citizens' support for redistributive policies may have also changed in recent years as deeper political integration into the EU has prompted a retrenchment of domestic welfare states. Beckfi eld (2006) argues that deepening EU integration has decreased national governments' autonomy over social policy, which has in turn prompted a decline in Western European welfare states. It is possible that the weakening of domestic welfare states has coincided with a shift in the ways that domestic welfare regime type affects attitudes toward redistributive policies. As social policy becomes increasingly "European," historical welfare regime type may account for less variation in Europeans' attitudes toward redistribution.
Hypothesis 8: Welfare regime type may account for some variation in Europeans' attitudes toward income redistribution. However, its effect on attitudes may have diminished in recent years as both Western and Eastern European countries have become increasingly integrated in the EU's common market structures.

Research Design and Methodology
Data
I test my hypotheses using data from the ISSP's Social Inequality III (1999) and IV (2009) surveys. The Social Inequality surveys ask people a variety of questions about their attitudes toward inequality and the government's responsibility for providing social protection. I examine attitudes toward redistribution in seven Western European countries (Austria, France, Germany 3 , Great Britain 4 , Portugal, Spain, and Sweden) and seven Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, the Czech 3 Previous research on attitudes toward income redistribution has often separated East and West Germany into separate country units, but I choose to treat them as a single country unit. Although East and West Germans differ in their attitudes toward income redistribution, they have shared the same contextual environment for quite some time. There has also been relatively easy migration between the East and the West, which makes it diffi cult to conclude that experiences under communism continue to differentiate current East German inhabitants from West German inhabitants. Thus, while examining East Germany separately may have been appropriate in the initial years after unifi cation, it is no longer appropriate to consider East Germany as its own country in the same way as other Eastern European countries. Consequently, I treat East and West Germany as a united Germany and weight the ISSP data to take into account the relative sizes of the East and West German populations. 4 The ISSP did not administer the 2009 Social Inequality survey in Northern Ireland. As a result, I limit my analysis of the United Kingdom to Great Britain. However, I apply contextual data for the United Kingdom to Great Britain in order to maintain consistency in using country-level contextual data rather than regional contextual data.
Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Slovenia). Although other European countries have administered the Social Inequality survey in 1999 or 2009, I restrict my analysis to EU member states that administered the survey in both 1999 and 2009 to maintain comparability.
Data are weighted at both the individual and country-level. At the individuallevel, I apply the ISSP-provided weights to adjust for instances of unequal selection probabilities. The ISSP reported unequal selection probabilities in Bulgaria and Germany in 1999 and Great Britain, Bulgaria, Germany, and the Czech Republic in 2009. At the country-level, data are weighted so that each country contributes 1,000 possible observations to the analysis in each period.
Dependent Variable
I measure support for income redistribution using a summary index of two questions on the ISSP Social Inequality survey (see Appendix for full question wording). Respondents are asked to note the extent to which they agree that 1) inequality is too high in their country and 2) it is the government's responsibility to reduce inequality. I sum respondents' answers to the two questions and then linearly transform the sum so that values span from 1 through 9. High values indicate support for government reducing inequality along with a feeling of too much inequality, while low values indicate opposition to government intervention in reducing inequality and a feeling that there is not too much inequality 5 .
I use this summary index to measure support for redistribution, rather than respondents' perceptions of the government's responsibility to reduce inequality, because past research suggests that the summary index better captures people's normative and cognitive attitudes toward redistribution. Dallinger (2010) argues that it is inappropriate to measure attitudes toward redistribution by only taking into account respondents' views on whether the government should reduce income differences. She explains that the survey question "mixes cognitive and normative aspects when asking people whether the state should intervene in income inequality" (2010, 339) . By contrast, the summary index assesses respondents' preferences for income redistribution, relative to the degree of inequality they perceive in their country. It thereby avoids the "ambivalence of whether the ideal or the realistic attitude towards state redistribution is being measured" (Dallinger 2010, 339) 6 .
5
Respondents who did not answer both questions with some level of agreement or disagreement (responses valued 1-5) were coded as missing and therefore were not included in the analysis.
6
Creating a summary index is also methodologically appropriate because both items are correlated. In 2009, the bivariate correlation for the two items was .531 in the West and .485 in the East. In 1999, the correlation was .557 in the West and .393 in the East. Auxiliary analyses were conducted on each item in the dependent variable index. Please see Appendix for regression results. Micro-Level Independent Variables I use people's self-reported sex, marital status, education level, socioeconomic class, and employment status as socio-demographic factors that may tap selfinterested support for income redistribution (Hypothesis 1). I measure marital status using a binary variable, where 1 indicates that the respondent reported being either married or in a long term relationship with a cohabitant. Education is an ordinal variable that captures the respondent's highest level of educational attainment on a scale from 1 to 5. Unemployment is measured as a binary variable indicating whether the respondent reported being unemployed at the time of the survey.
In contrast to the other objective indicators of people's self-interested support for redistribution, I measure class status as a subjective indicator. It is operationalized as the respondent's self-reported class position on a scale from 1 to 10. High values indicate that the respondent believes he belongs to a high social class 7 . The subjective measure of class status is unlikely to tap whether respondents will actually benefi t from income redistribution, particularly in Eastern Europe where people are more likely to report that they belong to lower social classes 8 . As a result, it is unlikely to be an indicator of people's actual self-interest in supporting for redistribution. However, the variable may adequately tap whether respondents think they will benefi t from income redistribution, and it may consequently offer a useful indication of people's belief that they have self-interest in supporting redistribution. Thus, even though the measure of class status is a subjective measure, it may nevertheless highlight the extent to which self-interest factors shape support for redistribution.
I include age as an indicator of the ways that socialization experiences may affect attitudes toward redistribution (Hypothesis 2). I measure age as the percent of the respondent's life that occurred before 1990. For Eastern Europeans, the age variable essentially captures how much of the respondent's life occurred under communism. Measuring age as the percent of life before 1990 therefore allows me to assess whether long-term personal experience under communism shapes attitudes.
In addition to examining how socio-demographic and socialization factors shape support for redistribution, I examine how ideological factors, specifi cally attitudes toward social mobility, affect support (Hypothesis 3). Drawing on Linos and West's (2003) analysis of social mobility beliefs and support for income redistribution, I 7 Although income may offer a more objective measurement of social status, I omit it from the analysis. For one, a sizeable number of respondents refused to provide their income. Because lower income respondents may be less likely to provide a response for their income, data for income is unlikely to be missing completely at random (MCAR). Secondly, where data are available, income is highly correlated with both education and subjective socioeconomic class, which presents a potential problem with multicollinearity. Other indicators of class status, such as occupational prestige, were not used because they are likely to be highly correlated with either unemployment or education. measure social mobility beliefs as respondents' views toward what is essential in "getting ahead" in society. In both 1999 and 2009, the ISSP asked respondents to indicate the extent to which they believe that 1) coming from a wealthy family, 2) knowing the right people, and 3) being corrupt are important for individuals' social position (see Appendix for question wording). These indicators represent exogenous factors that may affect social mobility. Respondents who believe that these factors are important for social mobility may be more likely to support redistribution because they may be less likely to blame low income people for their economic situation. I average respondents' views on the three social mobility items to identify the extent to which respondents believe that exogenous factors are important for social mobility 9 .
I also include a variable for personal social mobility to take into account the ways that individuals' personal experience with intergenerational mobility may affect attitudes toward redistribution. It is possible that people's beliefs about social mobility are partly shaped by their own experiences, and not only by their observations of others. I measure personal social mobility as respondents' answer to a question of whether their occupation is of a higher social class than their father's occupation. If respondents report that their occupation is of a higher class than their father's, then their responses are coded as 1 10 . Although past research on attitudes toward welfare policies has included binary variables for welfare regime type (Dallinger 2010; Svalfors 1997) , I operationalize welfare regime type as the size of the government consumption and measure it using It is appropriate to average respondents' views across the three social mobility items because responses are highly related. In 2009, they had a Cronbach's alpha of .51 in the East and .43 in the West. In 1999, they had a Cronbach's alpha of .51 in the East and .53 in the West. 10 Left-right party support may also be an ideological factor that is strongly related to support for income redistribution. However, I omit it for both theoretical and methodological reasons. On a theoretical level, it may not be appropriate to use the respondent's left-right party stance to measure ideology's effects in the East because Eastern European political parties have not been clearly aligned on the standard leftright spectrum (see Tavits & Letki 2009 I lag the data for the country-level variables one year behind the survey administration year because for some countries, surveys were collected in the early parts of the year before macroeconomic conditions were fully assessed. It would be unreasonable to expect that economic conditions measured at later time points would affect citizens' attitudes. I therefore use 1998 data on unemployment, inequality, and government expenditures when analyzing the 1999 survey results and 2008 data when analyzing the 2009 survey results 11 .
Macro-Level Independent Variables
Results
My analysis proceeds with both a cross-regional and cross-time comparison of support for income redistribution in Eastern and Western Europe. I fi rst explore country-level and regional mean responses and examine whether there has been a convergence in attitudes over time. I then present results from an OLS regression of attitudes on individual-level variables, controlling for country fi xed effects by including a dummy variable for each country in the model (omitting one country the reference country). Finally, I explore specifi c country-level variables' effects on attitudes by using a hierarchical linear model. high levels of agreement that income inequality is too high and that the government should take responsibility for reducing it. Out of a 9-point possible scale, individuals reported a mean level of support of 7.339 and 7.386 in 1999 and 2009, respectively. The range of mean support levels across countries is also fairly small. In 1999, there was a 1.9 point spread in scores, ranging from 6.361 (Germany) to 8.272 (Portugal), and in 2009, there was a 1.6 spread in scores, ranging from 6.478 (Sweden) to 8.091 (Hungary) . The small range further shows that Europeans in both the East and West generally support greater income redistribution. point to some convergence in Eastern and Western attitudes, the convergence has largely been due to slightly higher levels of support in Western countries.
Variations in Average Levels of Support
In addition to some difference between regions, there is variation in support levels within regions. The cross-country variation may suggest that there is not a well-defi ned regional culture when it comes to social justice norms, particularly in the West where cross-country variation is higher than in the East. Variations within regions may point to the important role that different country-level contextual factors play in affecting individuals' attitudes.
There has also been considerable variation in attitude changes across countries. In France and Germany, for example, support levels increased by over half a point, a considerable change given that there is only a 2-point range in support levels across years. Bulgarians similarly reduced their support for redistribution by almost half a point. Yet in contrast to the considerable changes in support in France, Germany, and Bulgaria, support remained virtually unchanged in Sweden, Spain, and Poland. 14 There is debate in the literature about whether it is appropriate to treat scaled variables as continuous or ordinal outcome variables when there are fi ve or more response categories. I report results that treat my dependent variable as continuous for ease of interpretation. However, to ensure the robustness of the results, the same model was also analyzed using an ordinal logistic regression. The signs and signifi cance of all the coeffi cients were largely the same, with two exceptions. Personal experience with social mobility was signifi cant in the ordinal logistic regression in the West in 1999, but it was not signifi cant in the OLS fi xed effects regression. Unemployment had a signifi cant effect on support in the West in 2009 using the ordinal logistic regression, but the effect was not signifi cant using the OLS fi xed effects regression. 15 Analyses were also performed on each item of the dependent variable index (see Appendix). Results for each item largely resemble the results for the index. Key differences are in the effects of gender and education. In 2009, neither Eastern nor Western European women held signifi cantly different assessments about the level of inequality than men. However, gender signifi cantly shaped support for government efforts to reduce income differences in both regions in 2009. In 1999, Eastern and Western Europeans' education levels were not signifi cant predictors of beliefs that inequality is too high, but education was a signifi cant predictor of the belief that government should reduce inequality. Also, unemployment is strongly and signifi cantly associated with the perception that inequality is too high in the West in 1999, but it is not signifi cantly associated with the belief that government should reduce differences in income. R2 values for each of the two items are very similar for Western European data, indicating that the model accounts for variation across both items similarly well in the West. The R2 values for the items differ more in the East, particularly in 2009 when the model accounts for more variation in beliefs that the government should reduce differences in income. 16 As hypothesized, several of the factors tapping people's self-interested motivations for supporting the welfare state signifi cantly predict support for income redistribution. Women, the less educated, and people who reported belonging to lower social classes have signifi cantly higher levels of support for redistribution in both the East and the West. Also, as hypothesized, the magnitude of these variables' effects is typically lower in the East than in the West.
Indivdiual -level factors shaping support for redistribution
Although I fi nd that mean levels of support for redistribution have remained virtually unchanged in the East, there have in fact been some important changes in the ways that Eastern Europeans form attitudes toward redistribution. Between 1999 and 2009, class became a stronger predictor of Eastern Europeans' attitudes, and the regional difference in class' effect on attitudes declined three-fold. In their earlier analysis of welfare attitudes, Lipsmeyer and Nordstrom (2003) argue that in contrast to Western Europeans, Eastern Europeans may respond less strongly to socio-demographic selfinterest factors (particularly unemployment) when forming attitudes toward welfare policies because of a general feeling of vulnerability during the market transition. economy. They may have expressed less support for redistribution in 2009 than in 1999 because they no longer felt that they might need or benefi t from redistribution.
While marital status has its hypothesized positive effect on attitudes as well, its effect was only signifi cant in the East in 2009. At that point, being married or cohabitating affected attitudes to a similar degree as acquiring an additional level of education or moving up one level in class status. The higher level of support for redistribution among married or cohabitating Eastern Europeans may be a refl ection of their concern with securing family benefi ts. Because child care subsidies and family benefi ts may have been better established in Western countries, Western married people may not have been as concerned with maintaining state family supports. The higher levels of support among Eastern European married people in 2009 could also refl ect couples' anxieties about providing for their families in light of the fi nancial crisis. However, more research is necessary to specify the mechanisms behind the change in marital status' effect in Eastern Europe.
Contrary to my hypothesis, employment status exhibited an inconsistent and generally insignifi cant effect on support for redistribution. Its effect was marginally signifi cant (p = .052) in Western Europe in 1999, at which point being unemployed increased support by almost a quarter of a point. Yet its effect was negative and insignifi cant in 2009. Like the change in class' effect in the East, the change in unemployment's effect in the West may be tied to people's perceptions of their vulnerability to market forces during economic hardship. It is possible that unemployment effect's on Western attitudes in 2009 became weaker and insignifi cant because even the employed envisioned themselves needing government supports at the onset of the 2008 fi nancial crisis.
As hypothesized, age, measured by the percent of the respondent's life before 1990, exhibited a signifi cant effect on Eastern Europeans' support for redistribution and an insignifi cant effect on Western Europeans' support. Age's effect among Eastern Europeans highlights some important generational differences in attitudes toward redistribution-older Eastern Europeans typically express stronger support for redistribution than younger Eastern Europeans. On the one hand, it is possible that older people's stronger support (particularly in 1999) may stem from the vulnerability that they experienced during the economic transition of the early 1990s. Older people may have experienced greater challenges in acquiring new skills to compete in the market economy, and they may have been more dependent on state supports as a result. On the other hand, older people, who spent a larger share of their lives under communism, may have expressed stronger support for redistribution because they had been socialized into Marxist ideology under communism, which may have made them favor redistributive policies more than younger people. Yet even though age remained a signifi cant predictor of Eastern Europeans' attitudes in 2009, its effect was three-times weaker than in 1999. Its effect on attitudes in the East also became more similar to its effect in the West. If socialization into Marxist ideology was in fact a key driver behind the difference in age's effect in the East and West in 1999, then it is possible that the change in age's effect may have stemmed from different socialization processes occurring in Eastern Europe through the process of EU integration. In particular, Eastern Europeans may have become increasingly socialized into Western market values after deeper integration into EU common market structures. Indeed, if older and younger Eastern Europeans have become increasingly socialized into Western norms, then we would expect to observe that lifetime experience under communism would have a weaker effect on Eastern Europeans' attitudes. However, further research would be necessary to determine whether the decline in age's effect on attitudes in the East stemmed from socialization experiences or other aspects of the post-communist market transition.
In addition to analyzing the effects of socio-demographic factors on attitudes, I examine how perceptions of social mobility may affect attitudes. People's personal experience with social mobility-whether their occupation is of a higher class status than their father's-is generally unrelated to support for redistribution. I suspect that there was an insignifi cant effect because the variable does not measure people's beliefs about why they experienced intergenerational mobility. Some may believe that they achieved a higher class than their father because of government assistance while others may believe that their mobility was because of individual efforts. Those who believed that they achieved social mobility because of government assistance may have been more supportive of redistribution than those who believed that they achieved mobility through their own efforts. Indeed, perceptions about social mobility have a much stronger effect on attitudes toward redistribution than personal experience with social mobility. As hypothesized, people who believe that factors beyond an individual's control are necessary for social advancement are signifi cantly more likely to support income redistribution in both the East and the West.
Contextual factors shaping support for redistribution
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 present results from multi-level analyses of individual and country-level factors affecting attitudes. The hierarchical linear models include a random intercept for country to take into account variance in countries' mean support levels. They also include random slopes for gender, education, and class in 1999 and social mobility perceptions, gender, education, and class in 2009 to take into account signifi cant variance in the ways that these variables affect attitudes across countries. Because the small number of countries offers limited degrees of freedom, I test the country-level variables' effects in separate models. The models also include all signifi cant interaction effects between region and individual-level variables. The interaction effects highlight differences in the ways that Eastern and Western Europeans form opinions and allow me to test my hypothesis that regional differences have diminished since the East's accession to the EU.
As hypothesized, the fi ndings show that differences in the ways that Eastern and Western Europeans form attitudes toward redistribution have largely disappeared. In 1999, unemployment, class, and age had signifi cantly different effects on attitudes in the East compared to the West. By 2009, none of these factors affected Eastern Europeans' attitudes differently than Western Europeans' attitudes. The changes in the effects of both age and class status refl ect shifts in the ways that Eastern Europeans' form attitudes toward redistribution. As the fi xed effects models show, older Eastern Europeans expressed lower levels of support for redistribution in 2009, such that their opinions more closely resembled older Western Europeans. Similarly, Eastern respondents reporting higher class status expressed stronger support for redistribution in 2009, such that their opinions also more closely resembled their Western counterparts.
In contrast to the regional convergence in the effects of age and class on attitudes, which stemmed largely from changes in Eastern European opinion formation processes, the convergence in the effect of employment status stemmed largely from changes in Western Europeans' opinion formation processes. Relative to 19999, employment status played a much weaker effect on Western Europeans' attitudes in 2009. Thus, in 2009, its effect in the West did not differ signifi cantly from its effect in the East because employed Western Europeans became more supportive of redistribution.
Convergence in Eastern and Western opinion formation processes is further illustrated through the change in the binary regional variable's effect on attitudes. Belonging to an Eastern European country had a signifi cant effect on attitudes in 1999, indicating that in addition to the interaction effects, there remained other unexplained differences in the ways that Eastern and Western Europeans formed opinions about income redistribution. These unexplained differences signifi cantly reduced Eastern Europeans' support for redistribution relative to Western Europeans' support. However, the binary variable was no longer signifi cant in the 2009 models, suggesting that there were no longer unexplained differences in the ways that Eastern and Western Europeans formed opinions in 2009. The only signifi cant difference between Eastern and Western attitudes was in marital status' effect. In 2009, married Eastern Europeans were signifi cantly more supportive of redistribution than married Western Europeans. Contrary to my macro-level hypotheses, national unemployment and the percentage change in GDP did not have signifi cant effects on attitudes in either 1999 or 2009. Consequently, the degree of economic decline from the preceding year and higher levels of unemployment do not appear to explain signifi cant variations in Europeans' attitudes toward income redistribution. Although a longitudinal analysis of attitudes within countries would be necessary to determine how the 2008 fi nancial crisis has affected Europeans' attitudes, the results seem to suggest that considerable changes in macroeconomic conditions themselves may not explain variations in individuals' support for redistribution across countries. However, it is possible that changes in macroeconomic conditions have greater effects on individuals' support for redistribution within countries than across countries. It is also possible that macroeconomic declines have a lagged effect on attitudes that is not shown in the data. Because the data were collected in 2009, they cannot show whether the sharp economic declines at the onset of the 2008 fi nancial crisis had an effect on attitudes after several years. Therefore, while it appears that changes in immediate macroeconomic conditions do not account for variations in support levels across Europe, it is unclear whether changes in macro-economic conditions may eventually affect attitudes.
The level of inequality exhibited its hypothesized insignifi cant effect on attitudes towards redistribution in 2009 and a weak, albeit signifi cant, effect in 1999. Although previous research has identifi ed a positive relationship between the level of inequality and support, my fi ndings show that Europeans who experienced higher levels of inequality expressed less support for income redistribution, after controlling for individual-level factors. Nevertheless, the effect was small. In 1999, when the effect was signifi cant, a substantial 5-point increase in the Gini coeffi cient would be associated with only .22 points lower support 17 .
Although government expenditures (as a percent of GDP) had its hypothesized, positive effect on attitudes in both 1999 and 2009, the effect was fairly weak in 2009 and insignifi cant in 1999. In 2009, a 10 percentage point increase in the level of government expenditures, which would effectively move a country from the bottom of the expenditure range to the top, is associated with only a .8-point higher mean level of support. Welfare regime type may therefore also be a weak predictor of citizens' attitudes toward income redistribution. Yet contrary to my hypothesis that the effect of welfare regime type would weaken over time because of welfare state retrenchment across Europe, government expenditure's effect on attitudes more than doubled between 1999 and 2009. It is possible that the fi nancial crisis may have strengthened the effect of welfare regime type on attitudes by making people in more expansive welfare regimes more supportive of redistribution, but more research would be necessary to determine whether and to what extent people's attitudes toward redistribution actually changed because of the fi nancial crisis.
Concluding Remarks
Much of the scholarship on Eastern Europe's integration into the EU has focused on the accession process' role in leveraging institutional change in the East. Although there has been some research on the ways that changes in political institutions have coincided with a developing democratic political culture, there has been less scholarship examining whether changes in market institutions have coincided with changes in social justice norms. Indeed, much of the research on Eastern Europeans' attitudes toward the welfare state has relied on data collected before the East's accession to the EU.
This analysis responds to the lack of recent research on Eastern European social justice values by examining whether there has been a convergence between Eastern and Western attitudes toward income redistribution since the East's accession to the EU. I fi nd that although Eastern Europeans' average support for redistribution has not converged with Western Europeans' support, there have been some important changes in the ways that Eastern Europeans form attitudes toward income redistribution. For one, social class status exhibited a signifi cantly different effect on Eastern and Western Europeans' attitudes in 1999, but the difference was no longer signifi cant in 2009. Since the East's accession to the EU, social class has begun to shape Eastern Europeans' attitudes more strongly and to a similar degree as it has in the West. Secondly, I fi nd that while experience under communism signifi cantly differentiated Eastern and Western Europeans' attitudes in 1999, it did not signifi cantly differentiate attitudes in 2009. Older Eastern Europeans' support for redistribution was no longer signifi cantly different from older Western Europeans' support in 2009. Because age is an indicator of socialization experiences, this fi nding suggests that socialization under communism may not account for signifi cant differences in Europeans' support for redistribution. Thus, even though mean attitudes toward redistribution have remained stable over time, changes in the ways that Eastern Europeans form opinions about redistribution suggest that there may have been some convergence between Eastern and Western attitudes toward redistribution.
In addition to highlighting some convergences between Eastern and Western opinion formation processes, the analysis identifi es some long-standing similarities in the ways that both Eastern and Western Europeans have formed their opinions. people's social justice norms. People's perceptions about social mobility-specifi cally, perceptions about whether people need to rely on exogenous factors to get ahead in society-have been a strong and signifi cant factor shaping opinions in both the East and the West. Furthermore, I fi nd that overall macroeconomic conditions are weak predictors of variations in support for redistribution across countries. Neither the country-level unemployment rate, percent change in GDP, welfare regime type, nor the actual level of inequality strongly and signifi cantly explain variations in Europeans' attitudes toward redistribution. Europeans generally favor income redistribution, and people experiencing different macro-economic environments often express similar levels of support for redistribution.
Although these fi ndings are preliminary and based on an exploratory analysis, they offer some important direction for further research on social justice norms in the European Union. Further research is necessary to specify the mechanisms behind the convergence that I observe in Eastern and Western opinion formation processes. Specifi cally, it would be important to examine whether the convergence in age's effect on attitudes is due to European socialization processes or broader effects of the postcommunist transition. Some comparison between attitudes in Eastern European EU states and former Soviet Union states may be particularly helpful in shedding light on whether and to what extent EU socialization has been motivating the convergence.
Nevertheless, despite the uncertainties surrounding the mechanisms behind the convergence that I fi nd, the results suggest that differences between Eastern and Western opinion formation processes have diminished since the East's EU accession. Thus, it is unlikely that individuals' experiences under communism will account for substantial variation in social justice norms across the EU. 
